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Abstract 
Recent corporate scandals in New Zealand, evidenced by the collapse of two major unlisted 
finance companies, involved narcissistic leadership, which in turn, had created narcissistic 
organisational identities where unethical behaviour was the norm. This paper uses a virtue 
ethics approach to argue that the narcissistic tendencies found in some directors, senior 
managers and organisational cultures are largely determined at the corporate governance 
level of the organisation. The BOD is ultimately responsible for the moral or immoral 
identity of the organisation. However, instead of advocating for rule-based reform, the 
authors contend that the problem lies with the character of the directors and the manner in 
which they exercise their judgement. An emphasis on virtuous character and practical 
wisdom will encourage the development of a moral organisational identity and consequently 
improve individual ethical behaviour in organisations. 
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ORGANISATIONAL NARCISSISM: A CASE OF FAILED CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE? 
Introduction 
A developing body of literature has begun to explore the presence of narcissism in 
organisations and in organisational leaders (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Downs, 1997 ; 
Duchon & Drake, 2008; Roberts, 2001). Recent corporate scandals in New Zealand, 
evidenced by the collapse of two major unlisted finance companies, involved senior 
executives and directors promoting their organisations as the optimal choice for investors 
while misleading them, and then practicing denial when the company’s serious financial 
problems became known. What kind of person would action such behaviour?  
 
The authors contend these organisations’ management control nexus (i.e. the board of 
directors (BOD), the chief executive officer (CEO) and the senior management (SM)) were 
narcissistic, and had, consequently, created narcissistic organisations where unethical 
behaviour was considered normal. Confronted with the challenge of improving ethical 
standards in general and avoiding narcissistic behaviour in particular, reformers could 
respond in one of two ways: to place more emphasis on character, or to change the rules of 
the institutions in which the individuals operate (Bragues, 2008). This paper argues that the 
narcissistic tendencies found in some directors, senior managers and organisational cultures 
are largely determined at the corporate governance level of the organisation. The BOD is 
ultimately responsible for the moral or immoral identity of the organisation. However, instead 
of advocating for rule reform, the authors contend that the problem lies with the character of 
the directors and the manner in which they exercise their judgement in the selection of the 
CEO and in-coming directors.  
 
The Vice of Narcissism  
In ancient mythology, Narcissus, a particularly handsome young man, rejects the advances of 
Echo a river nymph. A heartbroken Echo prays to Nemesis, the goddess of divine retribution 
against the proud, who causes Narcissus to fall in love with his reflection in a pool one day 
without grasping that the face gazing back at him is his own. Eventually, after pinning for 
some time, Narcissus recognizes the image in the water and realizing his inability to act upon 
this love, he wastes away to death at the edge of the pool (alternative versions of this tale 
have him reaching out to kiss his reflection and drowning or committing suicide by sword). 
According to the tale, his soul was sent to Hades, where he continues to gaze at his reflection 
in the river Styx, while the Narcissus flower grew where he died forever reaching towards the 
water.  
 
The modern psychoanalytic genesis of the term narcissism is Sigmund’s Freud’s 1914 work 
On Narcissism: An Introduction. In this, Freud defines narcissism as “a state of being the 
centre of a loving world in which the individual could act spontaneously and purely out of 
desire” (A. D. Brown, 1997, p. 644). Freud believed that as infants we experienced this state 
and as adults we project the possibility of returning to such a state by means of our ego-ideal, 
that is, “our model of the person we must become in order for the world to love us as it did 
when we were young” (A. D. Brown, 1997, p. 644). Unfortunately, no individual can ever 
attain this ego-ideal. The resulting futile awareness of this search, and as a means to protect 
our sense of self, ensures certain ego-defence mechanisms occur. Central to this 
understanding of narcissism, is the need for individuals to maintain a positive sense of self 
and the engagement of ego-defensive actions to preserve self-esteem.  
 
In modern parlance, yet still rooted in this ancient myth, narcissism “generally connotes a 
person who possesses an extreme love of the self, a grandiose sense of self-importance, and a 
powerful sense of entitlement” (Duchon & Drake, 2008, p. 303). While useful, this definition 
needs further unpacking. Brown (1997), while noting the divergent conceptions of 
narcissism, summarised much of the extant literature into six broad 
behavioural/psychological characteristics. Denial, the first of these, has the narcissistic 
individual “disclaiming awareness, knowledge, or responsibility for faults that might 
otherwise attach to them” (p. 646). Rationalisation is the narcissist’s attempt at justifying 
unacceptable behaviours or attitudes and presenting them in a socially acceptable form. Self-
aggrandisement refers to the tendency to overestimate one’s abilities or achievements. The 
narcissistic personality, imbued with these beliefs, is often accompanied by “extreme self-
absorption, a tendency toward exhibitionism, claims to uniqueness, and a sense of 
invulnerability” (p. 646). In addition to these characteristics, and to further self-enhancement, 
the narcissist also distorts reality through selective perception. This fourth one, attributional 
egotism, is the tendency to explain events in a self-serving manner and to attribute positive 
outcomes to causes internal to the self and negative outcomes to external factors. The 
psychoanalytic literature generally accepts that narcissists use self-serving behaviour to 
preserve and/or enhance self-esteem. A narcissist bolstered by the above characteristics, also 
has a strong sense of entitlement. This, in turn, is associated with “a strong belief in his/her 
right to exploit others and an inability to empathize with the feelings of others” (p. 647). 
Unfortunately, for him or her, this lack of feelings towards others matches an insatiable need 
for their approval and admiration. Thus, the narcissist finds themselves in the not-so- 
enviable position of “holding in contempt and perhaps feeling threatened by the very 
individuals upon whom he or she is dependent for positive regard and affirmation” (p. 647). 
Finally, narcissism is also associated with high levels of anxiety. Research demonstrates that 
narcissists suffer from feelings of dejection, worthlessness, hypochondria, despair, emptiness, 
fragility, and hypersensitivity. While anxiety itself is not an ego-defence, it is what the above 
ego-defence mechanisms seek to ameliorate. 1 
 
According to Brown (1997), while these characteristics define narcissism in broad terms, 
narcissism also occurs on a continuum from “normal” or “healthy” at one end to 
“pathological “ at the other. It is important to recognise that narcissism per se is a normal 
phenomenon and a “universal and healthy attribute of personality” (Cooper, 1986, p. 115) 
which represents a “healthy concern with the self and with self-esteem regulation” (Frosh, 
1991, p. 75). However, when taken to the extreme, narcissism can constitute a disorder that 
inhibits an individual’s capacity to function normally or to form meaningful relationships. 
 
Virtue Ethics and Corporate Governance 
Our discussion of Virtue Theory is based on the writings of Aristotle (and Alasdair MacIntyre 
to a lesser degree). Our focus is on the creation of a narcissistic organisational identity 
stemming from the personalities of senior figures. Sison (2008) has developed a corporate 
governance model based on Virtue Theory, arguing that good governance requires governors 
of good character. His model is based on Aristotle’s understanding of governance as ‘praxis’ 
or action, as opposed to ‘poiesis’ or production. An ‘action’ is good if it leads the actor to 
grow in virtue, while ‘production’ is simply good if it is efficient.  
                                                             
1 The American Psychiatric Association (APA) also lists narcissism among its personality disorders. The APA’s 
Diagnostic & Statistic Manual IV (DSM-IV) characterises a narcissistic individual as demonstrating several self-
centred attitudes and behaviours including exaggerating achievements, demanding of praise and admiration, a 
preoccupation with fantasises involving unlimited success, power, love and beauty, a feeling of superiority 
over others and of being more deserving based on that superiority, and being arrogant, haughty, patronising, 
or contemptuous. 
Before explaining further the implications this model has for narcissistic organisations, some 
important Aristotelian concepts need further explanation. Firstly, Aristotle provided an 
account of what it meant to have a successful life and a successful society (Flynn, 2008). For 
Aristotle, a successful or happy life or ‘eudaimonia’, is something everyone wants 
(Blackburn & McGhee, 2007). By eudaimonia, Aristotle meant a life in which our human 
capabilities are put to their best use (Flynn, 2008). This is a life lived kat’ areten, that is, a 
life lived in accordance with virtue. Aristotle arrives at his notion of virtue in the following 
way: when we say something performs well we mean it is fulfilling its purpose and the act or 
performance is ‘good’; if the purpose of the human being consists in the exercise of our 
cognitive capacities then virtue is nothing more than reason excellently used (Bragues, 2006).  
 
Neo-Aristotelians have unpacked these concepts further. Human nature contains a set of 
natural principles of practical reason, and when a person uses their practical reason (i.e. turns 
their mind to action), they open themselves to understand that in general, good should be 
done and evil avoided, and that virtue is good (Rhonheimer, 2008). In other words, human 
nature itself provides ethical goals (Annas, 1993). This is the basis for Aristotle’s conclusion 
that a virtuous life is indeed a good life. 
 
One’s character is a result one’s virtues. The virtues of character (moral virtues) such as 
courage and self-control arise through a repetition of action. They are habits engendered 
through practice but the practice of acquiring virtue always involves a rational choice; the 
choice endorses the habit.  Flynn (2008) asserts that practical wisdom (prudence) is the virtue 
that guides reason in this choice and it grows as one develops in virtue. 
Practical wisdom (prudence)…is a bridge between the intellectual and moral virtues. 
It entails an appreciation of the difference between what is good and bad in order to 
live a worthwhile life, and necessitates virtue of character in the sense that it cannot 
function properly without correct habits (p. 364). 
 
Many other approaches to corporate governance consider governance as an activity belonging 
to the category of ‘poiesis’ or production (Sison, 2008). This possibly explains the emphasis 
placed on rules in many corporate governance regimes. It seems that globally, the ideal goal 
of governance theory, is to create a foolproof instruction manual on the task of good 
governance (Sison, 2008). However, according to Virtue Theory, the ideal governor would be 
a prudent one, exercising judgement rather than following rules. The excellence of ‘praxis’ is 
prudence which develops through the acquisition of all the virtues. Based on this model, the 
development of a moral organisational identity, as opposed to a narcissistic one, is more 
likely. 
 
Virtue Theory also holds that a person’s character not only influences their actions but also 
their perception. The virtue of prudence or practical wisdom is the ability to know 
specifically what is good to do here and now and we develop prudence by acquiring virtue. 
As Aristotle wrote: 
The wise do not see things in the same way as those who look for personal advantage. 
The practically wise are those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly 
important, and thereby truly advantageous in life: who know in short, that is 
worthwhile to be virtuous (Aristotle, Trans. 1941; Book 6, Chp 13, 1144b31). 
 
Virtue and Organisational Identity  
Organisations, like individuals, have identities.2 These identities can be moral or immoral just 
as those of individuals. We argue that an organisation has a moral identity when it is centrally 
oriented towards a collection of virtues that both define what one is and what one tends to do. 
Morality is a function of an entity’s character (MacIntyre, 2007) and “unless virtue is a 
central part of the organisation’s self concept, ethical behaviour will never be considered an 
appropriate metric or standard to judge the outcome of decisions” (Duchon & Drake 2008    
p. 303) 
  
In order to assess the development of the narcissistic organisation, let us consider how 
organisational identities form and  function. Whetten (2006) defines organisational identity as 
“the central and enduring attributes of an organisation that distinguish it from other 
                                                             
2 Whetten (2006) conception of organizational identity rests on two key assumptions taken from organization 
and identity theory: 
1. Organizations are more than social collectives in that modern society treats organizations in many 
respects as if they were individuals – granting them analogous powers to act and assigning them 
analogous responsibilities as collective social actors 
2. Identity is equated with an actor’s subjective sense of uniqueness, referred to as the self-view or self-
definition and reflected in notions such as self-governance and self-actualisation. Framed in this 
manner, the identity of individuals and organizations is an unobservable subjective state – a causal 
attribution that is inferred from its posited effects or consequences (p. 221).  
organisations” (p. 220). He refers to these as organisational identity claims. These legitimise 
an organisation’s uniqueness and their capacity to determine a competitive domain and 
function ideally within that domain. These claims take two forms. Functionally, they consist 
of organisational attributes that determine similarity and difference from all others (i.e. this is 
who we are). Invoked consistently in organisational discourse, these attributes, refer to 
specific social categories (e.g., we are a university not a technical institution). This, in turn, 
signifies the boundaries of appropriate behaviour for a particular organisation. Structurally, 
organisational identity consists of attributes that configure activity in the organisation as 
shown in its programmes, policies and procedures, and that reflect its most important values. 
These attributes, invoked in organisational discourse as decision guides and points of 
communication, provide a foundation for the organisation in its all of its dealings (i.e., this is 
what we do; this is how we do it). When functional and structural attributes operate as 
irreversible commitments on some basis (i.e., they have passed the test of time; they have 
gained critical mass) they can “partially or completely eclipse the reference point that 
prevails more broadly external to the organisation” (Duchon & Drake, 2008, p. 301). In other 
words, the identity of the organisation takes preference over reference points in other social 
groupings (e.g. family and society).  
 
Organisations develop cultures that reinforce identity. A culture is “a set of important 
understandings that members of a community share in common” (Sathe, 1985, p. 6). These 
understandings are “largely tacit among members, are clearly relevant to particular groups, 
and are distinctive to the group” (Louis, 1985, p. 74). An organisation’s culture displays 
central and enduring elements that make up its identity. These include such things as 
“customs and traditions, historical accounts be they mythical or accurate, tacit 
understandings, habits, norms and expectations, common meanings associated with fixed 
objects and established rites, shared assumptions, and intersubjective meanings” (Sergiovanni 
& Corbally, 1984, p. viii). A culture embodies these elements and acts as a transferring 
mechanism of the organisation’s identity to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think and feel (Schein, 1992).  
 
Individuals in organisations share a common social identification and organisational self-
esteem is the collective self-esteem of the individuals acting as the organisation. Duchon & 
Drake (2008) contend that organisations, as social entities, “exist in their members’ common 
awareness of their membership, and so come to take on identities that are parts of their 
members’ identities, needs, and behaviours” (p. 302). Consequently, when individuals strive 
to protect or enhance a self-concept derived from a particular social entity, they collectively 
modify the self-esteem of that entity. Hence, the organisation can regulate self-esteem with 
ego-defensive behaviours. These, in turn, protect identity and enhance the legitimacy of the 
organisation. Unfortunately, if organisations are motivated, like people, to “protect their 
collective identity and legitimacy, then like people, they too can sometimes engage in 
extreme narcissistic behaviour” (p. 303).  
 
Organisational Narcissism  
As discussed earlier, the psychoanalytic literature generally views narcissistic behaviours as 
ego-defence mechanisms used to bolster an individual’s self-concept and protect their 
identity. Organisations, as collective entities of individuals, are similar. They also have needs 
for self-esteem that are regulated narcissistically (A. D. Brown, 1997). This response is a 
coping mechanism intended to protect and preserve the organisation’s identity. 
Unfortunately, like individuals, organisational ego-defence mechanisms taken to the extreme 
can lead to dysfunction and/or ruin. Furthermore, in the effort to protect itself, an 
organisation may create structures that reinforce and extend an extreme narcissistic identity. 
The extreme narcissistic organisation “loses sight of the ‘reality’ of its position in the 
marketplace and employs denial, self-aggrandizement, and a sense of entitlement to prop up 
its damaged sense of identity” (Duchon & Burns, 2008, p. 355). Such an entity seeks 
legitimacy at the expense of accountability. They pay scant attention to market responsibility, 
civic duty or ethical concerns (Ganesh, 2003). Consequently, the extreme narcissistic 
organisation is recognisable by observable attributes and behaviours. 
 
According to Brown (1997), such organisations deny facts about themselves using 
spokespeople, propaganda campaigns, annual reports and myths. They develop justifications 
for their actions through rationalisation. They self-aggrandise by making claims to their 
uniqueness, commissioning corporate histories and deploying their office layouts and 
architecture as signs of status, prestige and vanity. Narcissistic organisations, states Brown, 
attribute failure of their decisions to external factors, while at the same time, attributing 
positive results to the organisation itself. Annual reports, publicity campaigns and the 
manipulation of the media are among the variety of means utilised to achieve this purpose. 
Such organisations also assume an entitlement to continued successful existence and a 
consequent entitlement to exploit resources, people and other organisations to achieve this 
continued success. Finally, the narcissistic organisation suffers from social instability and 
alienation.  
 
There are several real-life examples in the research literature that correspond with Brown’s 
(1997) criteria. Stein (2003), in his investigation of the near collapse of the highly prestigious 
hedge-fund Long term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, found that acute narcissism in 
this organisation mirrored Brown’s (1997) description. Stein contends that an exaggerated 
sense of pride and conception of power and knowledge led the directors of LTCM to take 
unnecessary and extreme risks in the financial markets. Secondly, the feelings of contempt 
that LTCM had for others in the market – and a desire to demonstrate their superiority by 
triumphing over them - led the directors to increase their risk substantially. Ketola (2006) 
analysing the psychological defences of a company dealing with an oil spill identified the 
ego-defence mechanisms used to protect organisational identity, even at the expense of its 
morality. When faced with accusations of misconduct, the organisation practiced denial, 
repression, omnipotence, and attributional sublimation to avoid having to deal with the facts 
of their own actions. When confronted with the reality of the spill, they used rationalisation to 
accept responsibility but devalued the harmful impact of the spill on others and the 
environment.  
 
Acute narcissistic organisations’ identity and culture are excessively self-centred and 
exploitative. Duchon & Drake (2008) contend that 
Their membership will obsessively employ a sense of entitlement, self-
aggrandizement, denial and rationalizations to justify their behaviour and so protect 
the collective identity. Such organisations are not intentionally unethical - they are 
likely to have formal ethics programmes – but concerns about ethical, or even legal 
behavior will receive little more than lip service (p. 305) 
 
Ethics programmes in narcissistic organisations are a form of self-preservation – they are a 
way of telling the world ‘everything is good here’. Furthermore, Roberts (2001) contends, 
that such programmes are window dressing; what is relevant is not whether the ethics 
programme is in use but only that a narcissistic organisation appears to be implementing it. 
This allows the operational interior free to carry out its usual practices.  
 
The management-control nexus is often a source and perpetuator of organisational 
narcissism. Research has highlighted the strong relationship between leadership and an 
organisation’s identity (Curry, 2002; Voss, Cable, & Voss, 2006; Walsh & Glynn, 2008) and 
culture (Schein, 1992; Taormina, 2008; Toor & Ofori, 2009). Leaders embody and enact 
identity through discourse and policy/procedure setting. Consequently, they become the focal 
point of decision-making in the organisation. At the same time, their behaviours encourage 
the development of norms that inform employees throughout the organisation in a set of 
particular actions.  
 
If the organisational leadership is extremely narcissistic, then it is probable that identity and 
culture will mirror leadership and individuals within the organisation will reflect narcissistic 
tendencies. Once these practices become institutionalised, it is probable that individuals will 
think of their organisation, and themselves, as moral and continue their narcissistic (and 
likely unethical) behaviour without guilt (Anand, Ashworth, & Joshi, 2005). To those on the 
outside, this seems perverse, but those who have internalised the organisation’s culture see 
nothing wrong in what they are doing. To question what the organisation is doing is to 
threaten collective, and ultimately, individual identities’ that operate within it. As Duchon & 
Drake (2008) note, “extreme narcissistic organisations cannot behave properly because they 
do not have a moral identity” (p. 306).  
 
Duchon & Burns (2008) categorized Enron as having an extreme narcissistic identity. They 
quote Kurt Eichenwald’s book Conspiracy of Fools 
Crime was just one ingredient in a toxic stew of shocking incompetence, unjustified 
arrogance, compromised ethics, and an utter contempt for the market’s judgement. 
Ultimately, it was Enron’s tragedy to be filled with people smart enough to know how 
to manoeuvre around the rules, but not wise enough to understand why the rules had 
been written in the first place (p. 358). 
Duchon & Burns contend people in Enron were unwise because they operated in an 
extremely narcissistic environment characterised by entitlement, self-aggrandizement and 
denial that anything was out of order. The management-control nexus at Enron believed they 
were entitled to success. This led them to skirt around the rules applicable to everyone else. 
For example, they created and used their own projections for income as opposed to market-
trading prices. They avoided conventional accounting practices whenever it wanted to. 
Leadership believed they were entitled to a healthy-looking balance sheet. Enron viewed 
itself as omnipotent, changing the world for the better in a Godlike manner. The executives 
often spoke in messianic tones and viewed themselves as the best of the best, which, in turn, 
resulted in excessive exhibitionism throughout the company. Finally, when everything came 
to its inevitable conclusion in 2002, Enron and its executives went into denial mode. While 
this was morally questionable, what was worse was that Enron had been ignoring evidence of 
fraud and insider trading for years. Indeed, this had become standard practice in the company 
desperate to protect its identity.  
 
Something comparable happened at Hanover Finance & Bridgecorp in New Zealand (albeit 
on a smaller scale). It appears there were similar narcissistic defence mechanisms at work in 
both these organisations. In Hanover’s case, the management-control nexus were happy to 
skip around the market rules when it suited. For example, no consolidated accounts existed, 
there were large numbers of intercompany transactions of dubious nature and there was an 
extremely high ratio of related party transactions (Cone, 26 March, 2004). Independent 
directors were appointed late to the board, and right up until its insolvency, Hanover was still 
advertising itself as a finance company that could “handle any conditions even when its 
independent credit rating clearly is of a different view and the entire sector is operating in 
adverse conditions”(Gibson, June 20, 2010). Gaynor (21 Nov, 2009) notes, that Hanover 
Finance was one of the worst examples of corporate & management governance in New 
Zealand’s recent history. He also detailed questionable related party transactions while 
claiming that Hanover was partly a private bank for its executives. No one in the company 
questioned these practices and conflicts of interest. Indeed,  they appeared of little concern to 
management.  
 
Hanover constantly portrayed themselves as the biggest and the brightest of finance 
companies in New Zealand. They were more than happy to boast of their $1 billion dollar 
worth, their worthy community work3 and, as Deborah Hill Cone acerbically noted, “they’re 
not adverse to stories that make them look like big swinging dicks, such as when they were 
trying to put the kybosh on GPG’s plans for Tower” (26 March, 2004). In appealing against a 
judgement that caused them to remove adverts promoting this image, Hanover replied that it 
was “strong & capably managed by experienced people so that it can withstand any 
conditions and that Hanover Group had more than $1 billion dollars of assets so it must be 
                                                             
3 For example, saving the carnivorous Kauri snail in the Maungataniwha forest or their Stand Tall charity 
true” (Gibson, June 20, 2010). This self-aggrandizement led to exhibitionism both within the 
company and without. The founding director and CEO, Mark Hotchin, threw an elaborate 
birthday party for 80 guests at one of Fiji’s most expensive resorts and started building a $30 
million dollar residence while 17,000 investors were $527 million dollars out of pocket 
perhaps exemplifies this best; images of Nero fiddling while Rome burns spring to mind.  
 
Finally, when it all started going pear-shaped, Hanover, and its management-control nexus, 
did what all narcissistic organisations do. First, they denied anything was wrong, no surprise 
given that they had ignored many of these questionable practices up to that date. Second, they 
sought to shift the blame. Third, they provided guarantees to their investors about how they 
were going to fix it. To date the proposed $96 million of Hotchin & Watson’s own money to 
prop up falling investors is still coming (McNabb, September 27, 2010). 
 
Bridgecorp is a similarly sad story. When Bridgecorp collapsed, it owed 14,500 investors 
approximately $460 million dollars. Again, the CEO, Rod Petricevic appeared to have  
treated the failed company as his own private bank. According to the Serious Fraud Office4, 
he gave $1.2 million of Bridgecorp funds, to a business entity called ABb, an unregistered 
company run by a personal friend of Petricevic and used $1.8 million of investors' money to 
purchase and maintain the operational costs of a luxury yacht, the Medici (Nordqvist 28 June, 
2010).  
 
The evidence suggests that the management-control nexus of Bridgecorp had acted in a 
narcissistic manner. Again, we see a belief in the entitlement to success led management to 
make untrue statements in their investment statements and registered prospectus concerning 
the company’s overall financial position, solvency and liquidity. There were also dubious 
related party transactions, lending policies and procedures, and disclosure statements 
(Marwick, 23 Dec, 2008). Again, we see the self-aggrandizement, the belief that “the normal 
rules do not apply here”, and the idea that Bridgecorp is different or better than other 
companies. Finally, similar to our earlier examples, when the floodgates opened, the response 
was first one of denial then one of blame. 
                                                             
4 The Government Department that detects, investigates and prosecutes cases of serious and complex fraud. 
Found at http://www.sfo.govt.nz/Serious_Fraud_Office.html 
 
 Moral Organisational Identity and Leadership 
It is this paper’s contention that organisational narcissism, as demonstrated in the examples 
above, begins and ends with the management-control nexus and in particular the individual 
directors on the Board. This is because leaders shape the moral identity of the organisation. 
Weaver (2006) includes leader behaviour as a key determinant in the development of virtuous 
and vicious identities in organisations. This happens by members modelling leader behaviour 
(Bandura, 1986 ; M. E. Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, 2005; G.R. Weaver, Treviño, & Agle, 
2005) and from the way organisational cultural norms undermining virtue are internalised 
(Treviño & Weaver, 2003 ). 
 
The wider leadership literature supports this causal link between leader behaviour and the 
moral identity of the organisation. Gini (2004) asserts that all leadership is ideologically 
driven and it is about passing on values so that the ethics of the leaders determines the ethics 
of the organisation. Andreoli & Lefkowitz (2009) found that an ethical climate created by 
moral leadership was one of the most significant antecedents of ethical conduct. Others have 
emphasized the importance of consistency in communication and behaviour, in other words, 
‘leaders needing to walk the talk’, and the resulting benefits in terms of effective role 
modelling and perceived integrity (Gini, 1997; Kouzes & Posner, 1993; Oliverio, 1989; 
Simons, 1999).  
 
Some authors have argued that leader role modelling is the most critical factor determining 
ethical culture (Dickson , Smith , Grojean , & Ehrhart 2001 ; Morgan, 1993; Murphy & 
Enderle, 1995; Nielsen, 1989; Schein, 1992; Sims & Brinkmann, 2002). Jackall (1988) 
suggested that ethical behaviour in organisations is often reduced to adulating and imitating 
one’s superiors. Lord and Brown (2001) claim that leaders provide a ‘natural source of 
values’ for their employees while Bandura (1977), in discussions of socialization and social 
learning theory, suggests that employees imitate the values stemming from their leaders. 
Hood (2003), who looked specifically at the relationship between the CEO’s leadership style, 
values and the ethical practices of the organisation, found that leadership styles do influence 
ethical practices in the organisation. Brown, et al. (2005) considered managers to be a key 
source of guidance for ethical behaviour. 
 
Given this strong relationship between leadership and moral identity, we argue that if the 
management-control nexus exhibits narcissism, then it is probable that the individuals and the 
organisation as a whole will reflect these narcissistic tendencies.  
 
So, what does a narcissistic organisation look like? Duchon and Drake (2008) have argued 
that an organisation’s identity operates as an analogy to an individual’s personality and 
essentially determines its moral behaviour. They even go so far as to claim that an extreme 
narcissistic organisation cannot behave properly because it does not have a moral identity. 
This is because the organisation’s identity does not contain a predisposition to act virtuously 
and so it is morally flawed. 
 
Narcissistic organisations use ego-defence mechanisms to protect the integrity of its 
personality even at the expense of sacrificing the morality of its actions (Ketola, 2006). They 
become self-obsessed and use a sense of entitlement, self-aggrandizement, denial, and 
rationalisations to justify anything they do (Duchon & Drake, 2008). In such organisations, 
individuals and groups may be responsible for making decisions but those decisions will tend 
to be consistent with the larger system’s moral identity (G. R. Weaver, 2006) and so unethical 
behaviour can emerge unintentionally. This may explain how in the above-mentioned cases 
individual decision makers in senior positions did not question blatantly unethical behaviour. 
 
Employing a Virtue Model for Leadership Appointments 
This paper argues that the board of directors (BOD) ultimately determines the moral identity 
of the organisation through its choice of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and incoming 
directors. The BOD selects and appoints the CEO, who in turn, selects their management 
team and together they set the tone of the organisation (Schwartz, Dunfee, & Kline, 2005). 
While the law in New Zealand does not require a CEO and a management team (Institute of 
Directors 2008), the reality is that a BOD simply cannot manage a company requiring day-to-
day attention. A CEO and executive team under the direction and supervision of a BOD 
manages the organisation. Consequently, the CEO is the main portal through which a BOD 
exercises its direction and supervision; and in the main, the CEO shapes and nourishes the 
Comment [AU1]: Refer to email sent 
29/9/10 1:45pm 
organisation’s identity. The selection of the CEO is therefore one of the most important 
decisions a BOD makes (IODNZ, 2008).5  
 
Section 131 of the Companies Act in New Zealand requires directors to act in “good faith” 
and in what they believe to be the best interests of the company. While current business 
culture equates this with short-term monetary gain for a few (Pearlstein, 11 Sept, 2009), this 
culture could change. The Board of any company has the power to minimise the likelihood of 
organisational narcissism occurring by appointing directors and CEOs of “good” moral 
character, who also possess desired qualities such as business ability and ambition to 
maximise profits. However, the perception of what makes a ‘good’ director or CEO is a 
reflection of the moral character of each director on the Board, and the same can be said of 
the CEO in their selection of the senior management team. How do we know how a good 
CEO behaves?  
 
The author’s contend that Directors of ‘good’ character (in the Virtue Theory sense) would  
have a more holistic understanding of their responsibilities. Such a person will aim to achieve 
wealth in a virtuous way. They will not permit self-interest to take over- they will strive to be 
virtuous whether it benefits them or others (Annas, 2006). They will work for the long-term 
survival of the company as a whole in a virtuous manner. They will judge as a suitable 
candidate for director or CEO to be one who is committed to these goals. Furthermore, they 
will resist pressures to act in their own interests or sit back and let others pursue their self-
interest or jeopardise the future of the company by excessive risk-taking to bolster short-term 
results.  
 
Conclusion 
It is has been argued in this paper that the moral identity of an organisation is directly linked 
to the good character of individual directors on the Board. Prudent directors will ensure moral 
governance and the virtuous characters of the leaders of any organisation are the main 
determinants of the identity of that organisation. The sitting directors have the responsibility 
                                                             
5 In New Zealand, the existing directors effectively chose new directors. Shareholders are passive and cede 
significant authority to existing directors in relation to the selection of new directors. Consequently, the board 
itself determines the culture of the board.  
 
of selecting the CEO and nominating suitable candidates for future directorships. There 
judgement as to the nature of a good governor is crucial. Only a director of good character 
would recognise that an ideal CEO or director would be one, who has a good character. The 
presence of such leaders would ensure the establishment and maintenance of a moral 
organisational identity. 
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